> …And all of this exercise is predicated on the rather suspect notion that you can determine anywhere near reliable odds for any of these
> things occurring and calculate them in a meaningful way. … But I still have yet to be convinced that going for it on 4th makes any sense…
> trying for a first down on the ground only.

If I read things correctly, at the point of decision, USC had had eight posessions. From those, it got one touchdown, into sure field goal range twice, and scored two field goals. So let’s say, for the sake of discussion, that USC is four times as likely to be able to score a field goal or touchdown in a drive as they are to be able to score a touchdown. Then going for it makes sense if they have a one in four (or better) chance to get the touchdown.

Those numbers are not crazy. Naturally the chances to convert the fourth down, and to score on the ensuing drive are speculation, and the difference is marginal.

A full minute between college and pros rules is about two mid length passes over the middle in difference. As for the timeouts, I don’t think you should assume 2 is the average for his calculation without asking. In any way, my point is that you can’t discount the amount of time left based on timeouts and 2 minute warning, without also factoring in that that smaller remaining time would go farther in college.

Yes, working an onside kick into the odds would have to be figured in. And all of this exercise is predicated on the rather suspect notion that you can determine anywhere near reliable odds for any of these things occurring and calculate them in a meaningful way. I was also unaware of a difference in college onside kick rules.

Anyway, the main takeaway is that by far the biggest mistake was the prior playcalling and clock management, and I agree with that. But I still have yet to be convinced that going for it on 4th makes any sense. Tell Notre Dame that they get to have one play on defense from the 2 to absolutely lock in their win (and still a good shot of winning if they fail), or they can face fielding a kickoff, trying for a first down on the ground only, risking turnovers, covering a punt, and then defending the field when one big play can cost them the game, and they’ll take option one every time.